Anthony L. Hall is a descendant of the Turks & Caicos Islands, international lawyer and political consultant - headquartered in Washington DC - who publishes his own Internet Weblog at www.theipinionsjournal.com offering commentaries on current events from a Caribbean perspective

Therefore, I monitored Chinese President Hu Jintao’s first state visit to the United States this week just as a Cuban might have wondered about Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev’s first state visit in 1973.  And, by all accounts, Hu acquitted himself well as the leader of a new superpower rising as a formidable foil to the exercise of American unilateral superpower around the world.  Indeed, especially given the petty snub by President George W. Bush – who denied him the coveted honour of a formal state dinner (and added insult to this political injury by “allowing” a Chinese heckler to disrupt his ceremonial address) – it’s worth noting that Hu exercised his own unilateral prerogative by flying in to dine with the world’s richest man, Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates, at his mansion in Seattle, Washington before deigning to lunch with the world’s (ostensible) most powerful man at the White House in Washington, DC.

Although, it probably made good political sense for Hu to highlight the mutual admiration and goodwill that flowed during his lavish dinner with Gates and CEOs from the Fortune 100 companies that have helped China grow past France, Britain and Japan to become the second largest economy in the world.  After all, it was in this more cordial setting  that Hu assured America’s corporate titans that his government will open Chinese markets to more of their products (perhaps including the American beef Hu feasted on) and services (notably finance); and, that it will redouble efforts to protect their trademark and intellectual properties from widespread piracy by Chinese “entrepreneurs”. 

Whereas, during his lunch meeting and quasi-press conference with Bush, Hu had to endure Bush blathering on about currency fluctuations and democratic freedoms that they and everyone else knew would produce absolutely “no breakthrough”.  For his part though, Hu seemed to be lying in wait for the one question that most Americans thought would surely make him squirm - namely:

“When will China become a democracy with free elections?”

But Hu responded with unflappable Clintonian dexterity as follows:

"I don't know what do you mean by a democracy. But what I can tell you is that we always believe in China that if there is no democracy, there will be no modernization... We have always been expanding the democracy and freedoms for Chinese citizens... these freedoms have flowed in China since our opening in the 1970s... Today our people enjoy democratic supervision and democratic management…and we will promote their orderly participation in democratic freedoms...”  

Yet Hu had to have been irritated by constant whispers – from Seattle to DC – about his government’s unseemly habit of jailing its citizens for merely using “sensitive” online search-words like “Tiananmen”, “Tibet”, “democracy” and “Falun Gong” (the banned spiritual movement).  Moreover, it could not have helped the political atmospherics when Reporters Without Borders announced - on the eve of Hu’s visit - that the Chinese government’s Internet police (aided and abetted by Yahoo) had arrested and incarcerated even more journalists for promoting a “so-called Western-style democracy” than previously disclosed.

Nonetheless, China’s patented agenda for world power is entirely impervious to such whispers.  Because the Chinese have bought international immunity from political criticism by enticing countries all over world to accept their “Chinese-style democracy” as a system of governance worthy of respect on par with American-style democracy.   And, they have good reason for their national hubris in this respect because almost every country in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean has endorsed China’s fatuous notions of democracy by agreeing to sever ties with the truly democratic nation of Taiwan at its behest; albeit for the right price. 

Indeed, of the 14 countries in the Caribbean, only the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Vincent and the Grenadines still have relations with Taiwan.  Just two years ago, the Chinese made Dominica an offer it could not refuse, which led it to sell-out Taiwan and switch political allegiances to China as well. Meanwhile, all indications are that Taiwan is running out of money trying to stay current with the fees that are now required to maintain its diplomatic ties amongst these developing nations.  Because the Taiwanese are painfully aware that each country the Chinese buy-off diminishes their claim as a legitimate de facto independent state.

(I imagine the Taiwanese derived some consolation from another insult the Americans inflicted on Hu when - at the White House welcoming ceremony - China's national anthem was announced as the anthem of "the Republic of China"; which, of course, is the formal name of Taiwan. China's full name is the People's Republic of China.)

But, down the road, the price we may have to pay to remain in China’s good graces might be far more, proportionately, than China is paying today for political recognition.  Indeed, as I warned in a previous column:

...consider the many international developments that might lead China, for strategic reasons, to base missiles [or thousands of troops] in Jamaica [to protect its investment or citizens from local “unrest” - as the Americans did in Grenada, for example?]  or to convert its container ports, factories and chemical plants in the region to dual military and commercial use.

What would the Jamaican and other governments in the Caribbean do? Would they comply? Would they have any real choice in the matter? And, would America then blockade the entire region - as it blockaded Cuba during the missile crisis?

Now, consider China making such strategic moves in Latin America where the political influence it has purchased makes its Caribbean operations seem positively charitable...

Cold War II?